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Abstract
In this paper I begin to fashion a theory of musical form that I
call historical formalism.  Historical formalism posits that our
perception of the formal properties of a musical work is
informed by considerations not only of artistic categories but
also of the historical, sociopolitical, and cultural circumstances
within which that work was composed.
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1. Introduction:  Form and the philosophy of art
Form occupies a primary role in philosophical discussions about
art as, for instance, in Clive Bell’s claim that “the essential
quality in a work of [visual] art is significant form,”[1] and
Susanne Langer’s theory of art as expressive form.[2]  In
philosophical discussions of music, form proves to be crucial.
Formalists regard it as one of the most important artistic
aspects of a musical work and some of the most influential
theorists endorse formalist positions about musical
meaning.[3] Thus in On the Musically Beautiful, Eduard
Hanslick, godfather of the formalists in music, declares, “The
content of music is tonally moving forms.”[4]
In this paper I discuss form as one of the most important
artistic aspects of a musical work.  I argue, using a sample of
the pertinent philosophical literature, that even those
knowledgeable discussants who grant musical form its central
role often fail to furnish a fully convincing account of it.  The
subject of musical form is a notoriously difficult topic and my
present goal is not to provide an exhaustive account of it.  My
aim, rather, is to offer some preliminary thoughts toward a
theory of musical form that may contribute positively and
pertinently to a philosophical analysis of music.
I call the theory of musical form that I begin to develop in this
paper historical formalism.  Historical formalism posits that our
perception of a musical work’s formal properties depends both
on considerations of artistic categories and on knowledge of
the historical, sociopolitical, and cultural circumstances within
which that work was composed.  Historical formalism can be
considered a version of contextualism.  Because it makes room
for a set of considerations that exceed the boundaries of the
art-historical (musico-historical) context, historical formalism
is more far-reaching than other forms of contextualism,
particularly Kendall Walton’s contextualist interpretation of
artistic perception.  My inclusion of a larger set of
considerations as relevant to the apprehension of a musical
work’s form provides evidence in favor of the claim that within
the specifics of perceiving its formal features, music is
intrinsically interrelated with the cultural milieu in which it is
created.
I argue for historical formalism from the ground up.  I start by
considering a basic view that understands musical form as a
pure perceptual object.  In Sections 2 and 3 I argue that such
a view is incomplete.  I maintain that considerations of the
musico-historical categories to which a work belongs have an
impact on one’s perception of that work’s musical form.  In
Section 4, I expand the considerations that are relevant for
perceiving correctly a work’s musical form.  I show that not
only are considerations of music history and theory relevant,
but also that historical (broadly construed), sociopolitical, and
cultural considerations may be relevant.  I thereby clarify the
advantages of historical formalism over more restrictive
versions of contextualism.
2. Aural-form and categorial-form
A commonsense view considers musical form as one aspect of
a musical work whose characterization is unproblematic.  In
such a view, what we intend with musical form can be easily
identified as those structural properties featured in a musical
work that can be heard in a performance.  According to such a
characterization, the form of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony
consists of all the melodic lines, chords, harmonies, rhythms,
etc., that one can hear when attending a performance of that
work.  However, as soon as we think seriously about it, we
quickly recognize that the commonsense view is incomplete,
and that musical form is more complex than what it suggests.
As Arnold Whittall notes, “musical form” is an ambiguous
term.  On the one hand, it can refer to the structural
properties that one can hear in the performance of a musical
work.  On the other hand, musical form can also refer to “a
generic category (such as ternary, canon, sonata).”[5]  To
capture what Whittall is suggesting, I introduce a distinction
between categorical-form and aural-form.  Though implicitly
acknowledged in the theoretical debate (both philosophical and
musicological) about music, this paper is the first attempt to
develop such a distinction in a sustained way.  I have a
twofold aim in making this distinction:  first, to solve a
terminological incoherence that troubles scholarly works even
by distinguished thinkers such as Peter Kivy;[6] and second,
to provide a conceptual tool whose usefulness is validated by
the analysis of musical form developed in the discussion that
follows.
I define categorial-form as the musical form that refers to the
particular musical genres (sonata, rondò, etc.) that may be
determined by factors such as architectonic structure,
harmonic language, typical rhythms, the instrumentation, as
well as historical and geographical origins.  The categorial-
form, rondò, for instance, is characterized by a particular
architectonic structure, divided into a series of sections.  The
first section is regularly repeated between subsidiary couplets
(episodes) and appears again at the end of the composition. 
Schematically, the rondò’s structure can be represented by
ABAC … A, where A is the first section and B, C, etc., are the
couplets.  The categorial-form dodecaphonic music is
characterized instead by the use of a particular method of
composition whereby a predetermined set of twelve
nonidentical notes constitutes the basic material from which
the composition is generated.
Aural-form refers to the ordered set of structural properties
that can be heard in a performance.  It is intrinsically related
to features of sounds, such as their frequency, loudness, or
duration.  These features are objects of aural perception—that
is, objects that we perceive primarily, though perhaps not
exclusively, by means of sense organs receptive to properties
of sounds.  I define structural properties as those properties
pertinent to our perception and critical assessment of an aural-
form.
Structural properties can be differentiated into four different
types.  A first type contains those audible properties of sounds
that depend on their physical constitution, such as pitch (e.g.,
“being an E-flat”) and relations of pitch (e.g., “being a major
third”), duration (e.g., “being a quarter note”), dynamics
(e.g., “being a pianissimo”), and timbre (e.g., “being
mellow”).  Call these tone properties.           
A second type includes structural properties that depend on
the particular arrangement of tone properties. Call these
syntactical properties.  Properties of harmonic, polyphonic,
melodic phrases and thematic organization, such as “being a
dominant-tonic cadence” and “being a theme in G major,” are
syntactical properties.          
A third type of structural property includes musically
expressive properties.  The exact characterization of this type
may well be controversial.  Many, however, would accept
Budd’s account that a section of an aural-form “can be
agitated, restless, triumphant, or calm since it can possess the
character of the bodily movements which are involved in the
moods and emotions that are given these names.”[7]  In other
words, expressive properties are intrinsic to an aural-form and
capable of conveying certain aspects of human expressive
behavior, in particular those associated with the voice, which
they translate into musical sounds.          
A fourth type includes what may be called broad-span
properties, which depend on overall relations of similarity,
identity, contrast, etc., among syntactical properties drawn
from different sections of a work’s aural-form.  A repetition of
the first theme is a broad-span property of a particular section
of an aural-form.  Such a property depends on the perceived
similarity between a section characterized by the syntactical
property “being a theme” and a previous section possessing
the syntactical property “being the first theme.”
I believe that the perception of the structural properties of
aural-form often depends upon considerations of categorial-
form.  For instance, the unexpected absence of the repetition
of the exposition may very well have an impact on the
expressive properties of an instance of sonata form.  Consider,
for example, Beethoven’s String Quartet in F Major, Opus 59,
No. 1.  The first movement of the Quartet is in eighteenth-
century sonata form.  The categorial-form eighteenth-century
sonata form is characterized by three sections:  first, an
exposition that contains the first subject in tonic key and a
second subject in the dominant (and sometimes further
subjects, often repeated); a development follows, in which the
material of the exposition is elaborated in a kind of free
fantasia; and finally a recapitulation occurs in which the
exposition is repeated, often with modification, and the second
subject is transposed into the tonic.  
After the exposition, however, Beethoven skips the repetition. 
This feature, skipping the repetition, is a broad-span property. 
It is surely original, given the date of its composition (1806),
but it is not merely that broad-span property that interests
us.  It is rather the fact that, in what immediately follows the
exposition, Beethoven mimics a repetition of the exposition
down to the smallest detail of phrasing and dynamics.  Then,
suddenly, at measure 107, he introduces a G-flat that clearly
affirms the identity of the section:  we are listening to the
development.  The effectiveness of this passage results from
Beethoven’s conscious manipulation of the expectations of
those who hear the music and are tricked by this false start. 
The expressive quality of the passage, its surprising nature,
depends on the perceivable ambiguity of the first five
measures of the development.
The claim that one’s perception of an aural-form’s structural
properties depends on the categorial-forms to which that work
belongs sounds plausible and has been largely endorsed by
contextualists in artistic perception.  Jerrold Levinson,
however, argues against it.  In his view, knowledge of a work’s
categorial-form (simply “form” in his idiom) does not
significantly affect our perception of that work’s aural-form
(which Levinson calls “FORM”).[8]  Levinson’s view is
controversial and has been critically discussed elsewhere.[9] 
In the following section, I examine Levinson’s view and, while
rejecting its most extreme consequences, I accept some of its
provocative conclusions, which illuminate how we perceive
aural-forms.
In explaining the link between aural- and categorial-form, I
intend to establish the plausibility that contextual knowledge
can affect one’s perception of a work’s aural-form.  I also want
to provide evidence in favor of the claim that our perception of
a musical work’s formal properties can depend on
considerations of categorial-forms.
3. Linking categorial-form and aural-form
Levinson argues, by developing an idea that originated with
Edmund Gurney, that a piece of music is a temporal
process.[10]  Thus, because of the limitations of our aural
perception, musical pieces are never the object of a single act
of perception—like the façade of a building.  They are
perceived as they unfold in time and the portions that can be
aurally grasped (quasi-heard) as unity are of limited extent. 
Levinson identifies those portions as melodies.[11]
Levinson’s contentions about the nature of musical pieces and
our perception of them have important consequences in terms
of his theory of musical form.  Levinson argues that, as far as
perception is concerned, a musical form “is in effect exhausted
by the constitution of the smallest independent units, that is,
phrases and melodies, out of formless elements, and the
specific manner in which each independent unit leads to the
next.”[12]  In his view a musical form has positive artistic
value if it affords “an experience well worth having.”[13] 
Whenever evaluation is involved, the “essential form in
music”[14] still coincides with the linear development of
melodies and harmonies.
We can summarize Levinson’s view of musical form, using my
terminology, as follows:  the form of a musical work can be
generally reduced to its aural-form, especially in terms of its
tone, syntactical, and expressive properties.  Although
Levinson admits that broad-span properties are possibly
perceivable, he argues that their perception is difficult to
achieve and is often unnecessary for music appreciation and
evaluation.[15]  “The elevation of FORM [i.e., aural-form] over
forms [categorial-forms],” Levinson writes, “is very much in
the spirit of our present discussion.”[16]
Categorial-forms, in fact, are not perceptual objects; they are
merely historical categories and abstractions.  For instance, we
cannot perceive that the Allegro of Haydn’s Keyboard Sonata
in G Major (no. 4) is in sonata form.  We can apprehend that
aspect of the Allegro only conceptually by consciously
organizing what one has perceived prior to her judgment
about the Allegro being in sonata form.  We know that the
Allegro is in sonata form because we have heard the
identifying syntactical properties serially at the appropriate
places.  There is nothing that we can actually hear, per se,
that enables us to perceive a piece’s aural-form to be in
sonata form.  Since categorial-forms are not perceivable
features of a musical work, they cannot afford by themselves a
worthwhile experience.  For this reason Levinson believes that
considerations of categorial-forms should not affect our critical
judgment of a work’s aural-form.  Levinson does admit that
such considerations can possibly enhance our perception of the
impressiveness of individual bits of an aural-form, enhance our
perception of its cogency, facilitate our perception of its
melodies, contribute to our perception of its higher-order
aesthetic properties, and provide intellectual musical
satisfaction.[17]
How does Levinson handle cases like Beethoven’s Opus 59
No.1?  His account explicitly addresses the complications of
such cases.  He recognizes the existence of properties such as
this Opus 59’s “being surprising” at measure 107.  Using my
terminology, however, he holds that considerations of
categorial-forms are unnecessary for perceiving those
properties.  He argues that a listener can perceive them
simply by becoming familiar through listening to many actual
examples of works belonging to the appropriate categorial-
form(s).
Levinson justifies his view by introducing a distinction between
intellectual hearing-as and perceptual hearing-as. 
Intellectually hearing an aural-form as a particular categorial-
form “involves entertaining certain concepts in thought and
relating them to current perceptions, or consciously organizing
what one is perceiving under certain articulate categories.”[18]
 In other words when, for instance, intellectually hearing-as-a-
sonata a work’s aural-form, we classify explicitly what we just
heard in terms of some propositional knowledge, which include
notions such as exposition, repetition, first theme, etc.
Perceptually hearing an aural-form as a particular categorial-
form (for instance, a sonata) “involves not conscious thought
or categorization but a disposition to register and respond to
the musical progression one is presented in a certain
way.”[19]  To “perceptually hear-as-a-sonata” a work’s aural-
form means to have “internalized a certain norm [not a
categorial-form] from pieces of a given kind, and implicitly [to
sense] convergence with and divergence from that norm as
presented by a particular composition.”[20]  By having
internalized such a “norm,” a listener responds, for instance,
with a “reaction of surprise when a recapitulation structurally
due … fails to turn up.”[21]
A listener can internalize a sonata “norm” just by comparing
several examples of sonatas.  Knowledge of categorial-forms
or even a “prior abstract grasp of sonata structure” is not
required.[22]  In this sense, Levinson underlines that
perceptual hearing-as has nothing to do with propositional
knowledge. It is rather a form of knowing-how:  the
knowledge of “norms” (such as the sonata “norm”) need not
be even in principle articulable linguistically and, consequently,
is not known propositionally, like the knowledge of categorial-
forms, but behaviorally or experientially.[23]
For Levinson, intellectual hearing-as is not necessary for
perceiving structural properties such as Opus 59’s “being
surprising” at measure 107.  A listener can in fact identify
sections (e.g., the exposition), label different themes (e.g., the
first theme in the tonic) of Opus. 59, while still failing to
perceive that expressive property at measure 107.  Levinson
grants that the propositional knowledge involved in intellectual
hearing-as may facilitate or hasten the perception of “being
surprising” or similar properties.[24]  However, in order to
perceive it, we only need perceptual hearing-as.  Since
perceptual hearing-as does not require propositional
knowledge of categorial-forms, Levinson can still confine the
role of such knowledge to those “enhancing” ones as listed
previously.  That is, he can still deny that knowledge of
categorial-forms determines in part, at least sometimes, our
perception of an aural-form’s structural properties.
I believe that Levinson’s concatenationism is pointing in the
right direction.  First, it correctly emphasizes that perceiving
the aural-form of a particular musical work as a sonata
involves a “behavioral” response to sounds rather than a mere
capacity of describing what one has just heard.  Second, it
makes room for the possibility that a listener can develop the
ability to respond “behaviorally” to a sonata in the absence of
formal training.  A capacity to react to particular developments
in a sonata can certainly be acquired spontaneously through
attentive listening.  I believe that these two points are the
aims of Levinson’s project which, in this sense appears to be
partially successful.
I find Levinson’s view too extreme when he suggests that
perceptual hearing-as does not depend on propositional
knowledge of categorial-forms, but on non-propositional
knowledge of “norms.”  In the light of recent research in
epistemology, Levinson’s distinction between categorial-forms
and “norms” seems difficult to vindicate.  In the remainder of
this section, I maintain that there is no disjunction in principle
between knowledge of categorial-forms and knowledge of
“norms”:  in a qualified sense, they both amount to the same
propositional knowledge.  I therefore suggest that (i)
perceptual hearing-as necessarily depends on propositional
knowledge and that (ii) such knowledge must be propositional
knowledge of categorial-forms.
Levinson’s claim that knowledge of “norms” is non-
propositional and is distinguished from knowledge of
categorial-forms relies primarily on the premise that
propositional knowledge, and hence knowledge of categorial-
forms, is knowledge that can be easily articulated, that is, if
someone knows that p, she must have the capacity to express
p in words.  However, as Jason Stanley argues, “Whether this
premise is true or false depends upon which words count.”[25]
 If knowing that p requires being able to describe p accurately
and systematically, the premise is false or at least
controversial and would require sustained defense.  In our
case, knowing that eighteenth-century sonatas usually present
a repetition of the exposition does not imply knowing how to
express that belief accurately and systematically.
If articulation includes indexical or demonstrative expressions,
Stanley adds, then the premise that propositional knowledge is
knowledge that can be easily articulated may very well be
true.[26]  I know that my keyboard is this shade of white and
that the pages of that paper are that shade of white.  Though
surely having propositional knowledge of those shades of
white, I can express it only in demonstrative-involving terms. 
But, Stephen Davies also observes that a listener who cannot
articulate in this second sense her responses to an aural-form
surely does not sense convergence with and divergence from
“norms,” as Levinson holds.[27]
In our example, a listener who is able to perceive Opus 59’s
surprise expressive property around measure 107 must be
able to articulate verbally, when asked, something similar to
the following description:  “Here [mm. 103–106] is when the
tune seems to repeat the beginning as in those other similar
pieces I have listened to [18th-century sonatas], but here
[mm. 107] is when I realized that it was not a repetition and
this piece is somewhat different from those others.”  When we
allow indexical and demonstrative terms, knowledge involved
in perceptual hearing-as seems always articulable.  Since, in
this qualified sense, knowledge of “norms” is in principle
articulable, Levinson is left with no evidence justifying his view
that knowledge of “norms” is non-propositional; it cannot be
distinguished from the propositional knowledge of categorial-
forms.
I must emphasize that, according to historical formalism,
claims containing indexical and demonstrative terms and
expressing salient and recurring properties characterizing a
specific set of aural-forms still constitute knowledge of
categorial-forms. Such claims can be vague, unsystematically
collected, and expressed in words not complying with the
current musical jargon.  However, their content is in some
degree equivalent to that of musicological accounts of
categorial-forms.  It is in this qualified sense, which
incorporates what is correct in Levinson’s lesson, that historical
formalism sees perceptual hearing-as as depending on
propositional knowledge of categorial-forms.
4. Aural-form, history, politics, and culture
At this point, one might wonder whether our perception of a
work’s aural-form can depend only on considerations of
categorial-form.  In this section, I show that considerations
other than those of categorial-form may very well be relevant
for perceiving a work’s aural-form.  The historical,
sociopolitical, and cultural context within which a work is
composed can be relevant and should be considered.  It is this
aspect that distinguishes historical formalism from other
versions of contextualism.
When discussing the nature of musical form, Peter Kivy
directly addresses the issue of what kind of considerations
might be relevant for perceiving what I call a work’s aural-
form.  Though admitting that our perception of the structural
properties of a work’s aural-form can be informed by our
knowledge, Kivy identifies this knowledge with musical
knowledge in a strict sense—that is, knowledge of music
theory and of music history.  Considerations other than strictly
musical ones, such as “functionalist considerations and
considerations of social setting,” are, for Kivy, of no particular
value when we perceive and critically assess an aural-
form.[28]  In our practice of listening, an aural-form “is meant
to perform but one function:  to be [an object for] rapt
attention,” and “all its other past social settings and function
have been obliterated.”[29]
Social setting and social function, Kivy argues, might impart to
a musical work “artistic properties” that can be enjoyed and
appreciated (e.g., how well a piece of dance music suits the
movements of the dancers), but such properties are not
structural properties of a work’s aural-form.[30]  Social setting
and function, in other words, do not affect a work in terms of
our perception and judgment of its aural-form.[31]
I argue, in contrast, that to appreciate the complexities of an
aural-form to its fullest in an attitude of rapt aesthetic
attention, it is sometimes necessary to inform our perception
and critical judgment with considerations of social setting and
functions, that is, with historical (broadly construed), cultural,
and political considerations.  Let me offer an example. 
Consider the aural-form of Lied von der Belebenden Wirkung
des Geldes, composed by Hanns Eisler between 1934 and
1936.[32]  The various sections of this song draw on different
musical worlds.  The instrumental introduction is a quasi-
toccata and prelude, played by a jazz instrumentation.  The
first and the third main verses are a slow waltz tending toward
a valse triste.  The refrain is a toccata-quick march.  The bass
moves in a rhythmically regular way.  The harmonic
progression follows closely the rules of tonal harmony and
leaves nothing unresolved.  The vocal line and the voicing of
the accompaniment nicely imitate one another.  All the
elements are somehow questions that receive an answer.  The
song unfolds in a rather traditional way.  There are, one should
add, inconsistencies, peculiarities, and distortions in the formal
arrangement of the musical flow.[33]  
However, these last features of the Lied’s aural-form, some
critics argue, are the outcome of musical ineptness or—more
harshly—of “stupidity.”[34]  This Lied and almost all of the
songs Eisler wrote have been judged as “primitively
immediate.”  Adorno disdained Eisler, since “for the sake of
being understood [Eisler] has lowered his musical means to a
new outdated level, rather than rising to the challenge of
present-day music.”[35]  Such judgments are motivated by
critics' hearing and assessing the Lied’s aural-form in relation
to the categorial-form of twentieth-century avant-garde
music.
Eisler studied from 1919 to 1923 under Schoenberg, who
devoted considerable attention to his protégé.[36]  Eisler
became knowledgeable in traditional composition as well as in
modern technique and he was the first of Schoenberg’s pupils
to compose using the dodecaphonic method.  His piece,
Palmström, Opus 5, definitely belongs to the categorial-form
of twentieth-century avant-garde music.  If the Lied’s aural-
form is evaluated as an example of that categorial-form, then
the uses of rather traditional and consonant material, of
regular rhythms, and of tonal harmony cannot but be
perceived and critically assessed as primitively simple and
banal properties of an uninteresting aural-form.  But the
question arises of why a Schoenberg pupil, who showed
supreme control of the most complicated aspects of music
composition, would begin, at that stage of his career, to
compose music like the Lied?
The answers to such a question will not be found by looking at
the self-contained musical domain.  The explanation of why
Eisler radically changed his musical style is to be found in his
then-recent affiliation with the Communist Party and its
revolutionary spirit.  As a consequence of his political ideology,
Eisler committed himself “to the creation of an alternative
music culture on behalf of an excluded, ‘disenfranchised’ class
of working people.”[37]  Following his militant spirit, he
explicitly developed a new type of music:  “angewandte Musik”
(applied music).  Applied music can be defined, first, in
negative terms.  It is not bourgeois music, the music
traditionally played in concert halls as a form of entertainment,
in isolation from the struggles of the masses.  Applied music
serves a sociopolitical function to create a class consciousness
and to instruct and teach the working masses.[38]  Eisler
wrote protest songs, politically didactic pieces, and working
songs (along with Auferstanden aus Ruinen, the Democratic
Germany’s national anthem).  His politicized conception of
music motivated most of his musical and formal choices after
1926 and deeply affected his approach to musical materials
and compositional procedures.
Consideration of the historical, sociopolitical, and cultural
circumstances within which Eisler composed the Lied’s aural-
form, including the political function that he intended for his
music to play, has important consequences for how one
perceives its structural properties.  In this light, the Lied’s
aural-form is heard not as primitively simple, but as
economical and engaging.  The use of tonal harmonic language
is perceived, not as banal, but as enjoyable and welcoming
toward the audience that Eisler wanted to reach.  The
inconsistencies, peculiarities, and distortions, together with the
different musical worlds the aural-form draws on, are not
perceived as unpleasant but as surprising, designed to shock
the listeners by creating passages that sound stylistically
unexpected.
I, like many, consider the value of aural-forms to be related to
the aesthetic impact that their structural properties seem to
have on us, and believe our critical judgment will  need to be
revised accordingly.  Once we consider all the circumstances
relevant to the writing of the Lied and how those
circumstances affect our perception of its structural properties,
its aural-form should be judged as original and understandable
both for those with little experience in music and for the
specialist.  It should be assessed as an aural-form that
“make[s] [the listener] think,” reflecting the fractures and the
contradictions of the society in which Eisler was living.[39] 
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to most of Eisler’s post-
1926 works.
If the interpretation of Eisler’s Lied I have just proposed is
valid, Kivy’s account of musical form and similar versions of
formalism seem not comprehensive enough to admit that
sometimes historical, sociopolitical, and cultural factors can
affect our perception and critical judgment of a work’s aural-
form.  Historical formalism, an historically, socio-politically,
and culturally informed theory of musical form, is preferable
for the correct assessment of Eisler’s Lied and other, similar
pieces of music, as well.  Consider, for instance, Stravinsky's
use of folkloric music material in his work, The Rite of the
Spring (1913).  There is something in the expressiveness in
the bassoon’s opening melody in The Rite that one will not
understand while ignoring its folkloric origin.[40]
Following Richard Taruskin’s interpretation of the Rite, the
passage sounds “ancient,” that is, “evoking feelings of ancient
times.”[41]  Its expressive quality depends on the historical
and geographical provenance of the tune from which
Stravinsky explicitly drew.[42]  The Rite’s opening melody is a
quotation from a Lithuanian folk tune as reported in Anton
Juskiewicz’s musical anthology, Litauische Volks-Weisen.
 When Stravinsky composed the work, Lithuania and
Byelorussia were canonically associated with the “ancient”
origin of Russian culture.[43]  The association between
Lithuania and “ancient” Russia was justified by the survival of
archaic pagan rites in Lithuanian contemporaneous folk
customs.  In their turn, the stronger survival of pagan rites
was a consequence of the fact that “Christianity did not
entirely supplant the ‘old religion’ until the fifteenth century,
while Kievan Russia adopted Christianity in the late tenth
century.[44]
As with Eisler’s Lied, it does not seem possible to fully
appreciate the structural properties of The Rite’s aural-form if
we limit our considerations to those of musicological and
musico-historical knowledge, as Kivy’s theory suggests.  But, I
must add, most contextualist accounts of artistic perception,
and in particular Walton’s, do not make room for the larger
kind of considerations that are also relevant in those
cases.[45]
Walton identified the role of the context as solely artistic
categories.  He argued that by considering the given category
to which an artwork belongs, one can distinguish between an
artwork’s standard, variable, and contra-standard properties. 
The aesthetic impact of a work’s property, according to
Walton, depends on whether one views it as standard,
variable, or contra-standard.  In this sense, according to
Walton’s contextualism, considerations that have an impact on
one’s perception of an aural-form’s structural properties are
limited to considerations of the relevant art-historical (musico-
historical) context.[46]
In the cases discussed above, the impact that the structural
properties of those two aural-forms have depends upon a
larger set of considerations that include, in the case of Eisler’s
Lied, the composer’s political affiliation and the intended
sociopolitical function of his music.  In Stravinsky’s The Rite of
the Spring, the aesthetic impact of the opening bassoon
melody depends also upon considerations of its historical and
cultural origin.  Historical formalism can include those and
other pertinent considerations.
To conclude this section, I propose that our account of musical
form should be informed not only by considerations of the
relevant art-historical context, but also enriched, whenever it
seems fruitful, by a knowledge of the historical, sociopolitical,
and cultural circumstances within which a work is composed. 
The need to consider, at least sometimes, such a broad set of
circumstances testifies for the complexities of musical form,
complexities that have generally been obscured by previous
accounts.
5. Conclusion
The analysis of musical form demonstrates more complexities
than can be superficially assumed.  I have argued that a
suitable understanding of such a fundamental aspect of
musical works requires a more comprehensive theory of
musical form that I call historical formalism.  Historical
formalism challenges previous theories of musical form since it
holds that considerations other than those related solely to
music theory, music history, and the art-historical context—
that is, considerations of the historical, sociopolitical, and
cultural circumstances within which a musical work is
composed—might be relevant to our perception and critical
assessment of a work’s aural-form.
I am therefore persuaded that historical formalism, while
acknowledging music’s specific formal characteristics, gives us
some insight on music’s intrinsic relationship with the
mundane vicissitudes of our world, an aspect of that art form
that has often been obscured not only by conventional
formalist theories of musical form, but also by
contextualism.[47]
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